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Abstract
 Local Government Code of 1991 provides the Local Development Council (LDC) to 
promote people’s participation in the process of development planning at local governments in 
the Philippines. However, LDC had been said not to be functioning properly during 1990s and 
early 2000s to realize people’s participation in policy process although more and more Local 
Government Units (LGUs) had started to enact it. Therefore, we conducted an elite survey 
entitled “2011 Local Government Survey in the Philippines” in 2011 and 2012 to see the extent 
of diffusion and the state of functions of LDC in the Philippines. We found out through the 
survey that most of LDCs function to discharge their basic mission – formulation of develop-
ment plans and investment programs. The score of performance of each local government, 
however, is different from one to another. Therefore, we explore the elements which influence 
the functions and performance of LDCs. We will see the relations between the mayors’ attri-
butes and the functions of LDCs, and the factors which can improve the performance of LDCs.
【Keywords】  Local Development Council, Local Government Code of 1991, local governance, 
people’s participation, Philippines
1  Introduction
 Thirty years have passed since President Marcos 
was ousted by “People Power” in 1986. An impor-
tant feature of this post Marcos era is that civil 
society in the Philippines was given legal basis to 
enhance its participation into policy process in 
national and local level. As Buendia points out, 1987 
Constitution stands out in enhancing people’s polit-
ical rights through several provisions for direct 
people’s participation (Buendia 2005: 85－89).
 According Buendia, the constitution has at least 
thirty-one provisions which are related with people’s 
participation (ibid., 88). Most importantly, the 
constitution has Section 23 of Article II as a general 
clause which gives a mandate to the national govern-
ment to “encourage non-governmental, community-
based, or sectoral organizations that promote the 
welfare of the nation”. Article XIII of the constitu-
tion demands that the “state shall, by law, facilitate 
the establishment of adequate consultation mecha-
nisms” to prevent “the right of the people and their 
organizations to effective and reasonable participa-
tion at all levels of social, political, and economic 
decision-making” from being abridged (Section 16), 
also “state shall respect the role of independent 
people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue 
and protect, within the democratic framework, their 
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legitimate and collective interests and aspirations 
through peaceful and lawful means” (Section 15). 
And Section 14 of Article X encourages participa-
tion of NGOs to local governance for the purpose of 
decentralization. It says that “President shall provide 
for regional development councils or other similar 
bodies composed of local government officials, 
regional heads of departments and other government 
offices, and representatives from non-governmental 
organizations within the regions for purposes of 
administrative decentralization to strengthen the 
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the 
economic and social growth and development of the 
units in the region”.
 Based on the constitution, Local Government 
Code 1991 (LGC 1991) has several provisions related 
with NGO and People’s Organizations (POs). 
Chapter IV of LGC 1991 provides promotion of 
NGO and POs (Section 34), cooperation with them 
(Section 35), and assistance to them (Section 36). 
And LGC 1991 provides several institutions (local 
special bodies) to make participation of NGOs and 
POs into the process of decision making, policy 
implementation and monitoring of local governance. 
The list of these institutions includes Local Prequali-
fication, Bids and Awards Committee (Section 37), 
Local School Boards (from Section 98 to Section 
101), Local Health Boards (from Section 102 to 
Section 105), Local Development Council (from 
Section 106 to Section 115), and Local Peace and 
Order Council (Section 116).
 Among these institutions, Local Development 
Council (LDC) is the pivotal one in terms of the 
function for local development and the width of 
range of sector for which NGOs represent. Consid-
ering the importance of LDC, therefore, we will see 
how LDCs are operated in the LGUs and how they 
contribute to the improvement in the performance of 
LGUs in the Philippines.
2  Data
 The data we use in this paper is acquired by the 
survey entitled “2011 Local Government Survey in 
the Philippines” (The principal investigator was 
Fumio Nagai, Osaka City University). The popula-
tion was 1,515 local governments in 16 regions in 78 
provinces. Out of all the 1,591 governments in 17 
regions in 80 provinces, we excluded 76 govern-
ments in 2 provinces in Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) due to their political 
instability. The population consists of 135 cities and 
1,380 municipalities; 771 governments in Luzon, 336 
in Visayas, and 408 in Mindanao. And we used a 
representative sample of 300 local governments 
randomly selected in 16 regions, 71 provinces. It 
consists of 93 cities and 207 municipalities; 170 
governments in Luzon, 67 in Visayas, and 63 in 
Mindanao.
 In our survey we interviewed a mayor and a 
municipal/city planning and development coordi-
nator (C/MPDC) at each local government. We 
designed a questionnaire for mayors and that for 
coordinators respectively. Social Weather Stations 
(SWS) undertook interviews and most interviews 
were conducted face-to-face excepting very few 
cases. We had 300 respondents (100% response 
rates) from both mayors and C/MPDCs.
3   Issues and Problems Related with 
Local Development Council in its Early 
Years
 There have been pointed out several problems 
regarding LDC since it was provided in the LGC 
1991. This chapter describes these issues.
3－1  Inactiveness of LDC
 Garganera examines the state of LDCs after ten 
years since promulgation of LGC and reveals 75% of 
LDCs are inactive (Garganera 2004). Brillantes Jr., 
looking back over a decade of development of 
decentralization, also points out that “many local 
special bodies have not been convening regularly.” 
(Brillantes 2003: 16) This critical view is shared by 
the Department of the Interior and Local Govern-
ment (DILG) which is the main agency to monitor 
and regulate the local governments. In the occasion 
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of the 5th National CBMS Conference held in 2008, 
Manuel Q. Gotis, then the director of the Bureau of 
Local Government Development of DILG, stated 
that LDCs are inactive and this is one of the factors 
behind the poor local planning in the Philippines 
(Gotis 2008).
3－2  Underrepresentation of NGO
 The Philippines had 81 provinces, 145 cities, 
1,489 municipalities, and 42,036 barangays in the 
Philippines as of December 31, 2015. Based on the 
numbers of local governments in the layer of prov-
ince as well as city / municipality, Buendia calcu-
lates the number of seats for the representatives from 
NGOs around 16,000 (Buendia 2005: 257). The 
actual seats of the representatives of NGOs, 
however, had fallen short of the calculation during 
1990s. Buendia points out that NGO representatives 
secured only 729 seats (less than five percent of the 
expected number of seats) to the local special bodies 
as of 1992, and 4,635 seats (about 30% of the 
expected number of seats) as of 1997 (Buendia 2005: 
214－216).
3－3   Intervention by the Local Government in 
the process of the accreditation of the 
NGO Representatives
 There are some issues related to the accredita-
tion of NGO representatives by LGUs in the back-
ground of the problems mentioned above (Brillantes 
2003: 29). In some LGUs, DILG officials take crucial 
roles to call NGOs for accreditation. In other case, 
however, DILG officials leave whole process of elec-
tion of NGO representatives to local officials. There 
are some local assemblies (Sanggunian) who are 
deeply involved in the process of accreditation. The 
offices which take a leading role of accreditation are 
also varied – secretariat of Sanggunian in some 
cases, provincial office of development and planning 
coordination in other cases. Some LGUs allow total 
autonomy of NGOs to elect their own representa-
tives. There are LGUs which accredit all applicant 
NGOs while some LGUs neglect applications.
 This kind of variety of accreditation process 
shows a certain level of autonomy of LGUs (Bril-
lantes 2003: 29). In the environment where patron-
client political culture is prevailing like the Philip-
pines, however, these autonomous local govern-
mental processes may open ways to the control of 
participatory process by local government (Bunte 
2011). And this can lead local participatory gover-
nance to stalemate.
 Against the background stated above, this paper 
will examine how LDCs are operated in the LGUs in 
the Philippines.
4   State of Local Development Council 
(Distributions of Data from the Survey)
 As we see in previous chapter, it has been criti-
cized that LDCs don’t actually function enough or 
even don’t exist at all. Thus we will investigate in 
this chapter whether LDC are organized and func-
tioning to discharge its basic mission. Then we will 
explore the extent of NGOs’ participation in LDCs.
4－1  Basic Function of LDC
 In this section, we will explore 1) whether LDC 
discharge their basic mission such as formulating 
“development plans and policies” as well as “public 
investment programs”, 2) whether LDC holds its 
general assembly regularly in accordance with the 
law, and 3) whether LDC provides occasion to its 
members including NGO representatives to propose 
their idea of projects and policies related to the 
development of their community.
4－1－1   Formulation of Development Plans and 
Investment Programs
 Development planning is one of the most 
important mandates which LGU should cope with, 
because any ordered and comprehensive social and 
economic developments of local community are 
realized through active coordination taken by LGU. 
Section 106 of LGC 1991 gives mandate to LGUs to 
formulate multi-sectoral comprehensive develop-
ment plan. And Section 109 provides the functions of 
provincial, city, and municipal development councils 
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as follows:
(1) Formulate long-term, medium-term, and 
annual socioeconomic development plans and 
policies;
(2) Formulate the medium-term and annual public 
investment programs;
(3) Appraise and prioritize socioeconomic devel-
opment programs and projects;
(4) Formulate local investment incentives to 
promote the inflow and direction of private 
investment capital;
(5) Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the imple-
mentation of development programs and projects; 
and
(6) Perform such other functions as may be 
provided by law or competent authority.
 Provisions mentioned above in minds, we asked 
C/MPDC if the LDC of his/her LGU formulates the 
comprehensive development plans (annual, medium, 
long term) and the public investment programs 
(annual and medium term).
 The results are shown in tables below. From 
Table 1 to Table 3 show the state of development 
plan formulation, and Table 4 and Table 5 show the 
state of the formulation of investment programs.
Table 1  Annual Development Plan
Frequency %
Formulate 291 97.0
Not formulate 9 3.0
Total 300 100.0
Table 2  Medium-Term Development Plan
Frequency %
Formulate 273 91.0
Not formulate 27 9.0
Total 300 100.0
Table 3  Long-Term Development Plan
Frequency %
Formulate 253 84.3
Not formulate 47 15.7
Total 300 100.0
Table 4  Annual Investment Program
Frequency %
Formulate 287 95.7
Not formulate 13 4.3
Total 300 100.0
Table 5  Medium Term Investment Program
Frequency %
Formulate 247 82.3
Not formulate 53 17.7
Total 300 100.0
 We can see, from these tables, that more than 
90% of LDCs formulate annual and medium-term 
development plans as well as annual investment 
program. On the other hand, at least 80% of LDCs 
formulate long-term development plan and medium-
term investment program. These results tell us that 
most LDCs have capacity more or less to formulate 
development plans and investment programs.
4－1－2  Operation of LDC
 As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the 
main issues on LDC is its inactiveness. Accordingly, 
we investigate if LDCs operate their general assem-
blies in accordance with LGC 1991. Section 110 of 
LGC 1991 provides that “the local development 
council shall meet at least once every six (6) months 
or as often as may be necessary”. With this provision 
in minds, we asked C/MPDC how many times his/
her LDC hold general assembly in a year (Table 6).






 Table 6 shows us that all LDCs hold general 
assembly at least once in a year and 230 (76.7%) of 
all LDCs hold general assembly more than twice a 
year. It means most LGUs abide by the law. And a 
striking fact is that a considerable number of LDCs 
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(106 or 35.3%) hold general assembly three times a 
year, in addition to the number of assembly desig-
nated by law.
 And then we asked C/MPDC whether LGU 
obtain any ideas of projects from the members of 
LDC during the general assembly. Considering that 
LDC is an institution which realizes participatory 
local governance, we assume that general assembly 
is functioning as an occasion for NGOs and other 
members to propose their aspirations and idea of 
projects to local government. The results are shown 
in Table 7.
Table 7   LGU Obtain Ideas of Projects from 





 As Table 7 shows us, most of LDC functions as 
occasions for the members to propose their ideas of 
projects to local government. Then we also asked in 
which sector the members propose ideas of projects. 
We showed the list of sectors of 1) agriculture / 
fishery, 2) health, 3) environment, 4) social welfare, 
5) infrastructure development, 6) public market, 7) 
transportation, 8) housing, 9) education, 10) peace & 
order, 11) livelihood projects. The results are put in 
Table 8.
Table 8  Frequency of Project Proposal by Sector
(N=300, Multiple Response Allowed)
Frequency %
Infrastructure Development 277 92.3
Environment 264 88.0
Social Welfare 253 84.3
Agriculture & Fishery 248 82.7
Livelihood Projects 236 78.7
Health 232 77.3
Education 230 76.7
Peace & Order 216 72.0
Public Market 189 63.0
Transportation 182 60.7
Housing 159 53.0
 We can say, based on the results which Table 1 to 
Table 8 indicate, most LGU more or less make basic 
functions of LDC work or they try to obey the law by 
setting LDC and holding general assembly in accor-
dance with related provisions of LGC 1991.
4－2  Extent of People’s Participation in LDC
 As we discussed in chapter 1, most important 
feature of the Post-Marcos regime is people’s partici-
pation in policy process have gained enhanced legal 
basis. The legal system in the Philippines, as a 
whole, has mechanisms to protect people’s political 
rights through containing provisions which promote 
concrete participation of NGOs, POs and private 
sector in the process of decision making, policy 
implementation, and policy evaluation. LDC is one 
of the most important institutions for people’s 
participation in the policy process of local govern-
ments. We will investigate in this section, therefore, 
the extent of involvement of NGOs in the organiza-
tion of LDC.
 First, we will see how many percent do NGO 
representatives occupy the seat of LDC. Section 107 
(b) of LGC 1991 provides the composition of city / 
municipal development council as follows:
(1) All Punong Barangays in the city or munici-
pality;
(2) The chairman of the committee on appropria-
tions of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sanggu-
niang bayan concerned;
(3) The congressman or his representative; and
(4) Representatives of non-governmental organi-
zations operating in the city or municipality, as 
the case may be, who shall constitute not less than 
one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the fully orga-
nized council.
 Considering Sec 107 (b) (4) which provides the 
number of the representatives of NGOs, we asked C/
MPDC how many members, including representa-
tives of NGOs, the LDC has. If a LGU follows the 
law, LDC of such LGU should have the representa-
tives of non-governmental organizations not less 
than one-fourth of the total members of the council.
 The result is shown in Table 9. Number of LDCs 
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which have NGO representatives not less than one-
fourth of the total members of the council is 83 
(27.7%) in population (300). Table 9 tells us that most 
LDCs don’t abide the provision of the law regarding 
the ratio of representatives of the NGOs.
Table 9  NGO Occupation Ratio
Frequency %
Less than one fourth 202 67.3
More than one fourth 83 27.7
Don’t know / Outlier 15 5.0
Total 300 100.0
 Second, we will explore the composition of the 
executive committee of LDC. LGC 1991 provides 
executive committee should be organized within 
LDC to represent LDC and act in its behalf when it is 
not in session, because LDC shall hold general 
assembly just twice in a year in accordance with the 
law. Section 111 of LGC 1991 says about the func-
tion of the executive committee as follows:
(b) The executive committee shall exercise the 
following powers and functions:
(1) Ensure that the decision of the council are 
faithfully carried out and implemented;
(2) Act on matters requiring immediate attention 
or action by the council;
(3) Formulate policies, plans, and programs based 
on the general principles laid down by the 
council; and
(4) Act on other matters that may be authorized by 
the council.
 The provisions listed under (b) of Section 111 
indicate that the executive committee has a crucial 
role to formulate development plans and projects, 
and to make a smooth policy implementation. And 
then Section 111 provides the composition of execu-
tive committee in each level of local governments 
from the province to barangay as follows:
(1) The executive committee of the provincial 
development council shall be composed of the 
governor as chairman, the representative of 
component city and municipal mayors to be 
chosen from among themselves, the chairman of 
the committee on appropriations of the Sanggu-
niang Panlalawigan, the president of the provin-
cial league of Barangays, and a representative of 
nongovernmental organizations that are repre-
sented in the council, as members;
(2) The executive committee of the city or munic-
ipal development council shall be composed of the 
mayor as chairman, the chairman of the 
committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang 
Panlalawigan, the president of the city or munic-
ipal league of Barangays, and a representative of 
nongovernmental organizations that are repre-
sented in the council, as members; and
(3) The executive committee of the Barangay 
development council shall be composed of the 
Punong Barangay as chairman, a representative of 
the Sangguniang Barangay to be chosen from 
among its members, and a representative of 
nongovernmental organizations that are repre-
sented in the council, as members.
 These provisions require at least one representa-
tive from NGOs should be a member of the executive 
committee. Considering this requirement, therefore, 
we asked C/MPDC whether the executive committee 
of the LDC under the jurisdiction of his/her LGU has 
extra-members from NGOs in addition to the 
members designated by law. If LGU is favorable for 
the participation of NGOs in the LDC, LDC may 
organize its executive committee with extra-
members from NGOs. Table 10 shows the results.
Table 10  Extra-Member from NGOs
Frequency %
No Extra-member 172 57.3
Have Extra-member 128 42.7
Total 300 100.0
 The results tell us that there are a considerable 
number of LDCs (128) which have extra-members 
from NGOs although they do not compose as 
majority of LDCs.
 And then we will compare the average of NGO 
occupation ratio in general assembly between the 
LDCs which have extra-members from NGOs and 
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the LDCs which don’t have such members. The 
assumption here is if a LDC has more representa-
tives from NGOs as the members of general 
assembly, such LDC has an executive committee 
with extra-members from NGOs. For examination of 
this assumption, we utilize the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The results are shown in Table 11.








Groups .051 1 .051 4.128 .043
Within 
Groups 3.601 291 .012
Total 3.653 292
 As Table 11 shows, there is a statistically signifi-
cant correlation between the LDCs which have rela-
tively large number of representatives from NGOs 
and the LDCs which have executive committee with 
the extra-members from NGOs at the p < .05 level 
[F(1, 291) = 4.13, p = 0.043]. It means if a LDC has 
more NGO representatives, its executive committee 
also has more NGO representatives.
 Then we will examine the selection procedure of 
the representatives from NGOs. Section 108 of LGC 
1991 stipulates that “within a period of sixty (60) 
days from the start of organization of local develop-
ment councils, the nongovernmental organizations 
shall choose from among themselves their represen-
tatives to said councils” and that “the local Sanggu-
nian concerned shall accredit nongovernmental 
organizations subject to such criteria as may be 
provided by law”. There are principles, at the back-
ground of this provision, that NGOs and POs shall be 
given their utmost possible autonomy because they 
are the representatives of common local residents. 
Therefore, we can assume that a LGU which 
complies with the law faithfully would allow NGOs 
to select their representatives only by themselves 
without intervention by mayor especially. In fact, 
Brillantes found out LGUs which “encouraged the 
NGOs themselves to constitute such “pre-accredita-
tion” bodies, if only to make sure that the NGOs who 
would be accredited would have been acceptable to 
the NGO community themselves” (Brillantes 2003: 
29).
 Considering the principle of the provision of the 
section mentioned above, we asked C/MPDC who 
attends the selection of the representatives from 
NGOs / POs providing the list of actors such as 
“mayor”, “DILG local office”, “city / municipal 
administrator”, “planning officer”, “other LGU 
offices”, and “Sanggunian members”. The results are 
indicated in the tables from 12 to 17.
Table 12  Attendance of DILG Local Office
Frequency %
Attending 270 90.0
Not Attending 25 8.3
No Response 5 1.7
Total 300 100.0
Table 13  Attendance of Mayor
Frequency %
Attending 276 92.9
Not Attending 17 5.7
No Response 7 2.3
Total 300 100.0
Table 14  Attendance of Administrator
Frequency %
Attending 177 59.0
Not Attending 103 34.3
No Response 20 6.7
Total 300 100.0
Table 15  Attendance of Planning Office
Frequency %
Attending 284 94.7
Not Attending 12 4.0
No Response 4 1.3
Total 300 100.0
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Table 16  Attendance of Other LGU Offices
Frequency %
Attending 231 77.0
Not Attending 52 17.3
No Response 17 5.7
Total 300 100.0
Table 17  Attendance of Sanggunian
Frequency %
Attending 268 89.3
Not Attending 22 7.3
No Response 10 3.3
Total 300 100.0
 Except for the administrator (attendance rate: 
59.0%) and LGU offices other than the planning 
office (attendance rate: 77.0%), in almost all LGUs, 
DILG office (attendance rate: 90.0%), mayor (atten-
dance rate: 92.9%), planning office (attendance rate: 
94.7%), and Sanggunian (local assembly) (atten-
dance rate: 89.3%) attend the selection of the repre-
sentatives from NGOs. It is expectable that DILG 
office, planning office, and Sanggunian attend the 
selection of NGOs representatives. DILG office, as a 
supervising agent of LDC, would attend the selec-
tion. As to the planning office, it is mandated by 
LGC 1991 to take a role of the secretariat (Section 
113). And according to the LGC 1991, Sanggunian 
“shall accredit nongovernmental organizations 
subject to such criteria as may be provided by law” 
(Section 108). In other words, these three offices are 
mandated to commit the procedural matter to orga-
nize LDC.
 In the case of mayor, however, the law does not 
say anything about his/her involvement into the 
clerical matter such as LDC organizing process 
including selection of the representative from NGOs. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explain about mayor’s 
high attendance rate to the selection of the represen-
tatives from NGOs.
 One possible reason is that there is some 
cautiousness on the side of local government. A 
planning and development coordinator from one 
LGU in Western Visayas told to the author that the 
purpose to involve NGOs is to make them neutral 
politically (interviewed on Sept. 8, 2010). Consid-
ering the history of development of NGO movement 
in the Philippines when some NGOs engaged into 
advocacy taking the position of anti-government 
especially during Marcos presidency, it is expected 
that governments have such kind of cautiousness 
against NGOs.
 Another reason is, for the mayors, taking a closer 
look at activities of NGOs makes policy formulation 
and implementation smoother. A mayor from 
Western Visayas once told to the author that the 
mayor, living there long time, knows well who 
among NGOs have been conducting projects 
cordially and who are organized just to get subsidy 
from government (interviewed on Sept. 5, 2010). For 
a mayor, competency and reliability of NGO matter 
much when LGU select representatives from a circle 
of NGOs. In another word, distrust against NGO 
may instigate mayors to attend the selection of the 
representatives from NGOs.
 As we observed so far, there are certain reasons 
on the side of mayors to attend the selection process 
of NGOs. This behavior of mayor however can be 
taken by NGOs as unreasonable monitoring and 
pressure from mayor who is a politically most influ-
ential person of local government. These concerns 
were also shared by DILG during the early years of 
implementation of LDC. A study on LDC by DILG 
found that the “Local Chief Executive determines 
which NGOs are invited to participate, which 
amounts to political interference, and causes a lack 
of transparency in accreditation” (DILG 2001). This 
is closely connected to the another concern which is 
that a mayor, through exertion of his/her political 
influence and pressure to select NGO representa-
tives, may control the process of formulation of 
development plans and public investment programs 
to realize his/her or his/her close allies’ own inter-
ests rather than the wide range of public interests.
People’s Participation in the Local Administration in the Philippines 
― 85―
5   Relations between the State of LDC 
and the Performance of LGU
 In the previous chapter, we explored the actual 
state of LDC such as its function, implementation of 
general assembly, composition of LDC and its exec-
utive committee, and situation of the selection 
process of the representatives from NGO. We will 
examine in this chapter the relations between the 
state of LDC and the performance of LGU in the 
Philippines. For this purpose, we utilize the data 
which are taken from Local Governance Perfor-
mance Management System (LGPMS) developed by 
the DILG as dependent variables (performance 
indices of each local government).
 LGPMS is the performance indicator based on 
the self-appraisal by the LGUs and it has five perfor-
mance areas – (1) Administrative Governance, (2) 
Social Governance, (3) Economic Governance, (4) 
Environmental Governance, and (5) Valuing Funda-
mentals of Governance – and seventeen service 
items as well as three value indicating items – a) 
Local Legislation, b) Development Planning, c) 
Revenue Generation, d) Resource Allocation & 
Utilization, e) Customer Service, Civil Applications, 
f) Human Resource Management & Development 
(all as indices of Administrative Governance), g) 
Health Services, h) Support to Education Services, i) 
Support to Housing & Basic Utilities, j) Peace, 
Security & Disaster Risk Management (all as indices 
of Social Governance), k) Support to Agricultural 
Sector, l) Support to Fishery Services, m) Entrepre-
neurship, Business & Industry Promotion (all as 
indices of Economic Governance), n) Forest Ecosys-
tems Management, o) Freshwater Ecosystems 
Management, p) Coastal Marine Ecosystems 
Management, q) Urban Ecosystems Management (all 
as indices of Environmental Governance), r) Partici-
pation, s) Transparency, t) Financial Accountability 
(all as indices of Valuing Fundamentals of Gover-
nance). All performance indices are shown with five-
point scale; point 5 being the highest performance 
and 1 being the lowest. In this paper, we utilize the 
data in year 2011. Table 18 shows the descriptive 
statistics of dependent variables which are taken 
from LGPMS 2011.
Table 18  Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable (from LGPMS 2011)
Frequency Min Max Mean SD
Local Legislation 300 1.33 5.00 3.86 .741
Development Planning 300 2.04 5.00 4.57 .511
Revenue Generation 300 1.63 5.00 3.78 .690
Resource Allocation and Utilization 300 1.00 5.00 3.54 .815
Customer Service - Civil Applications 300 3.10 5.00 4.68 .363
Human Resource Management & Development 300 1.80 5.00 4.75 .549
Health Services 300 2.97 5.00 4.71 .363
Support to Education Services 300 2.00 5.00 4.49 .575
Support to Housing & Basic Utilities 300 1.00 5.00 4.05 1.299
Peace, Security & Disaster Risk Management 300 2.60 5.00 4.39 .460
Support to Agriculture Sector 277 1.42 5.00 4.24 .687
Support to Fishery Services 161 1.00 5.00 3.97 .868
Entrepreneurship, Business & Industry Promotion 300 1.58 5.00 4.07 .738
Forest Ecosystems Management 201 1.00 5.00 4.75 .713
Freshwater Ecosystems Management 250 1.00 5.00 4.53 .995
Coastal Marine Ecosystems Management 162 1.00 5.00 4.84 .549
Urban Ecosystems Management 300 1.48 5.00 4.01 .655
Participation 300 2.00 5.00 4.33 .635
Transparency 300 1.27 5.00 4.58 .584
Financial Accountability 300 2.99 5.00 4.63 .317
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5－1   Frequency of General Assembly and 
Performance of LGUs
 First, we will analyze the relationship between 
the frequency of general assembly of LDC and the 
performance of LGUs. The hypothesis here is that 
the more frequent holding general assembly, the 
higher LGU’s performance tend to be.
 A multiple linear regression was calculated to 
predict LGU’s performance based on the frequency 
of general assembly (F of GA), city/municipality 
difference (C/M), the level of income class of each 
LGU (Income), island groups (island groups 1 & 
island groups 2), mayor’s orientation of governance 
(Efficiency/Participation), mayor’s occupational 
background (Business/Non-business), mayor’s style 
of governance (NPM/Non-NPM)1), and mayor’s 
familial background (Political/Non-political)2). We 
put the independent variables such as “C/M”, 
“Income”, “island groups 1”, “island groups 2”, 
“Efficiency/Participation”, “Business/Non-business”, 
“NPM/Non-NPM”, and “Political/Non-political” to 
see if there are effects from these variables rather 
than the frequency of general assembly (“F of GA”). 
“F of GA” is measured in frequency, “C/M” is coded 
as city = 1, municipality = 0, “Income” is coded as 
income class 1 and above = 1, income class 2 and 
below = 0, “island groups 1” is coded as Visayas = 1, 
others = 0, “island groups 2” is coded as Mindanao = 
1, others = 0, “Efficiency/Participation” is coded as 
Participation = 1, Efficiency = 0, “Business/Non-
business” is coded as Business = 1, Non-business = 
0, “NPM/Non-NPM” is coded as NPM = 1, 
Non-NPM = 0, and “Political/Non-political” is 
coded Political = 1, Non-political = 0.
 As to the performance on “Development Plan-
ning”, a significant regression equation was found (F 
(9, 290) = 5.025, p < .000), with an R2 of .135. LGU’s 
predictable performance on “Development Plan-
ning” is equal to 4.332 + .063 (F of GA) + .303 (C/
M) + .182 (Income). LGU’s performance score on 
“Development Planning” increases .063 point when 
frequency of general assembly increases once, 
performance score of cities is .303 point higher than 
that of municipalities, and performance score of 
LGUs with income class 1 and above is .182 higher 
than that of LGUs with income class 2 and below. 
Therefore, frequency of general assembly, besides 
city/municipality difference as well as income class, 
is effective to improve LGU’s performance on 
“Development Planning”.
 And then regarding the performance on 
“Resource Allocation, Utilization”, a significant 
regression equation was found (F (9, 290) = 8.479, 
p < .000), with an R2 of .208. LGU’s predictable 
performance on “Resource Allocation, Utilization” 
is equal to 3.094 + .128 (F of GA) + .518 (C/M) + 
.396 (Income) － .228 (island groups 1) － .263 (island 
groups 2). LGU’s performance score on “Resource 
Allocation, Utilization” increases .128 point when 
frequency of general assembly increases once, 
performance score of cities is .518 point higher than 
that of municipalities, and performance score of 
LGUs with income class 1 and above is .396 higher 
than that of LGUs with income class 2 and below. On 
the other hand, performance score of a LGU is .228 
point lower when such LGU is from Visayas, and 
.263 point lower if such LGU is from Mindanao. 
Therefore, frequency of general assembly, besides 
city/municipality difference as well as income class, 
is effective to improve LGU’s performance on 
“Resource Allocation, Utilization”.
5－2   NGO Occupancy Ratio and Performance 
of LGUs
 Second, we will analyze the relationship 
between the occupancy ratio of NGO representatives 
in LDC and the performance of LGUs. The hypoth-
esis here is that the higher the occupancy ratio of 
NGO in LDC, the higher LGU’s performance tend to 
be. There is a principle at the background of this 
hypothesis that participatory governance improves 
the performance of local governments.
 A multiple linear regression was calculated to 
predict LGU’s performance based on the NGO 
occupancy ratio in LDC (NGO Ratio), frequency of 
general assembly (F of GA), city/municipality differ-
ence (C/M), the level of income class of each LGU 
(Income), island groups (island groups 1 & island 
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groups 2), mayor’s orientation of governance (Effi-
ciency/Participation), mayor’s occupational back-
ground (Business/Non-business), mayor’s style of 
governance (NPM/Non-NPM), and mayor’s familial 
background (Political/Non-political). We did not, 
however, find any significant relationships between 
the NGO occupancy ratio in LDC and the perfor-
mance of LGUs.
5－3   Mayor’s Presence at the NGO Selection 
and Performance of LGUs
 Third, we will analyze the relationship between 
the mayor’s presence at the selection of NGO repre-
sentatives in LDC and the performance of LGUs. A 
multiple linear regression was calculated to predict 
LGU’s performance based on the mayor’s presence 
at the selection of NGO representatives in LDC 
(Mayor Presence), city/municipality difference (C/
M), the level of income class of each LGU (Income), 
island groups (island groups 1 & island groups 2), 
mayor’s orientation of governance (Efficiency/
Participation), mayor’s occupational background 
(Business/Non-business), mayor’s style of gover-
nance (NPM/Non-NPM), and mayor’s familial 
background (Political/Non-political).
 As to the performance on “Development Plan-
ning”, a significant regression equation was found (F 
(9, 283) = 5.028, p < .000), with an R2 of .138. 
LGU’s predictable performance on “Development 
Planning” is equal to 4.199 + .297 (Mayor Presence) 
+ .307 (C/M) + .155 (Income). LGU’s performance 
score on “Development Planning” increases .297 
point in LGUs where mayors attend the selection of 
representatives from NGOs, performance score of 
cities is .307 point higher than that of municipalities, 
and performance score of LGUs with income class 1 
and above is .155 higher than that of LGUs with 
income class 2 and below. In other performance 
areas we could not see any significant differences 
between LGUs where mayors attend the selection of 
representatives from NGOs and the ones where there 
is no presence of mayors at selection of NGO repre-
sentatives.
6  Concluding Remarks
 LDC was established as an ace institution to 
realize efficient and participatory development plan-
ning at local governments in the Philippines. It has 
been however criticized for its inactiveness, 
prolonged accreditation process of NGOs, and 
unreasonable intervention by mayor into the selec-
tion process of the NGO representatives. These 
negative perceptions on LDC in minds, we have 
examined in this paper the state of LDCs after two 
decades of their establishment.
 We found out through analysis several points 
regarding LDC. First, we found that most (around 80 
to 90%) of LDCs function to discharge their basic 
mission – formulation of development plans and 
public investment programs. Second, large majority 
of LDCs (76.7% of them) holds their general 
assembly regularly in accordance with law (twice a 
year). Third, almost all LDCs (97.3% of them) 
provide occasion to their members including NGO 
representatives to propose their idea of projects and 
policies related to the development of their commu-
nity. Given these findings, we can state that oper-
ating LDC is already common practice among LGUs 
in the Philippines after two decades of promulgation 
of LGC 1991.
 With regards to the expected role of LDC as an 
institution to promote people’s participation in the 
development planning, there are other some findings. 
First, most LDCs don’t abide the provision of the law 
regarding the ratio of representatives of the NOGs 
(not less than 25% of full LDC members). Only 83 
(27.7%) LDCs meet the criteria. Second, there are a 
considerable number of LDCs which have extra-
members of the executive committee from NGOs 
although they do not compose as majority of LDCs 
(128 (42.7%) LDCs have extra-members from NGO). 
And if a LDC has more NGO representatives, its 
executive committee also has more NGO representa-
tives. Third, in almost all LGUs, mayors show their 
presence at the selection process of the representa-
tives from NGOs (attendance rate: 92.9%). Even 
though there are some reasons behind this, mayor’s 
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presence gives certain political pressure to NGOs 
and there may be a controlling effect on the develop-
ment planning.
 Finally, we examined the relations between the 
state of LDC and the performance of LGU in the 
Philippines. We investigated three relations: 1) 
frequency of general assembly of LDC and the 
performance of LGUs, 2) occupancy ratio of NGO 
representatives in LDC and the performance of 
LGUs, 3) mayor’s presence at the selection of NGO 
representatives in LDC and the performance of 
LGUs. Hypotheses are the more active and open to 
NGOs LDC is, the higher LGU’s performances tend 
to be. The results show us an ambiguous situation. 
As we expected, the more frequency of general 
assembly of LDC, the higher LGU’s performances in 
the areas of “Development Planning” and “Resource 
Allocation, Utilization” which are the main jobs of 
LDC.
 However, the results also tell us that the level of 
NGO participation does not have significant effects 
to improve performance of LDC. This result may be 
related to some features and competence of NGOs. 
Firstly, NGOs and POs usually pursue their indi-
vidual projects and pay little attention to the whole 
picture of development planning. Secondly, some 
NGOs and POs may not have enough capacity to 
discharge the assigned duty to them to formulate 
development plans and public investment programs. 
Then mayor’s presence at the selection of the repre-
sentatives from NGOs improves the performance of 
LGUs in the area of “Development Planning”. One of 
the possible explanations on this result is that the 
mayors who attend NGO selection process have been 
established relatively strong and productive network 
with NGOs therefore their presence at the selection 
process does not necessarily mean they are trying to 
control NGOs.
 Unlike the widely shared belief about LDC in the 
Philippines, our investigation revealed that LDCs 
had become common practice among LGUs after 
two decades of promulgation of the LGC 1991. We 
henceforth should explore factors of LDC which can 
improve the performance of LGU. In this paper we 
only could examine a few points of LDC which 
affect the performance of LGUs. These results of 
course don’t explain the all dimensions of impor-
tance of LDC for local developmental governance. 
We still have to go through holistic analysis to 
understand the significance of LDC for the local 
governance in the Philippines.
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Notes
 1) “NPM” indicates mayors who take New Public 
Management style of governance.
 2) “Political” indicates a mayor who has at least one 
family member of second degree of consanguinity 
who is a politician concurrently with the mayor.
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